Spoils of War? A Solution to the Hermitage Trove Debate by Stuhl, Seth A.
COMMENT
SPOILS OF WAR? A SOLUTION TO
THE HERMITAGE TROVE DEBATE +
SETH A. STUHL*
1. INTRODUCTION
Degas's Place de la Concorde. Van Gogh's The White House at
Night. Renoir's In the Garden. For decades these masterpieces,1
along with countless other works of art and cultural heritage,
were thought to be lost among the ruins of World War Hl.2 In
February 1995, however, a stunned art world witnessed the
emergence of these pieces from the secret catacombs of Russian
+ For the sake of simplicity, and with all due respect for the Pushkin and
other museums, this Comment refers to the breadth of the art discussed as the
"Hermitage trove" and to the entire controversy as the "Hermitage
controversy."
* J.D. Candidate, 1997, University of Pennsylvania; B.S., 1994, Cornell
University. My thanks to Constance Lowenthal, Steven Urice, Karen Zemble,
and Weld Henshaw for their comments, and to Eric McCarthy, Tina Chao, and
Thad Bracegirdle for guiding this Comment to publication. I dedicate this
Comment to my parents, Linda and Robert Stuhl, for instilling in me a respect
for the written word.
I See Jean MacKenzie, Festive Openingfor 'Trophy A rt'Exbibition, Moscow
TIMES, Mar. 30, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, Non-US File
(describing the artwork as "masterpieces"); but see Jamey Gambrell, Displaced
Art, ART IN AM., Sept. 1995, at 88, 92 (questioning the artistic significance of
the artwork in the trove).
2 See Gambrell, supra note 1, at 88 (noting that many paintings were
"thought irretrievably lost" after World War II); James Meek, Hermitage Puts
Stalin's German Loot on Display, GUARDLAN, Dec. 4, 1996, at 12 (stating that
the artwork in the Hermitage trove "was believed ... [to have] been
destroyed").
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museums.3 The ensuing controversy in the international art
community over the art's proper home has been as passionate as
the debate surrounding the Elgin Marbles.4 Since its reemergence,
the trove has been alternately described by commentators as the
"last prisoners of World War Hl,"" reparation for a "unique
unprecedented act in world history,"6 and lost artwork whose
recovery is "just short of miraculous."7  The variety of descrip-
tions of the trove is indicative of the complexity of the controver-
sy, which has become a cause celebre in intellectual spheres
ranging from the economic to the political.
The trove consists of art seized by the Soviet army from
German collections at the end of World War IVI Hidden beneath
Russian museums for nearly five decades, this collection of
artwork resurfaced early in February, 1995 as the centerpiece of
two controversial exhibits in Russia.' The exhibit held by St.
' See generally Robert Hughes, The Spoils of War: Russia's New Displays of
Art Looted from Germany Reignite a Debate Over Who Rightfully Owns Such
Plunder, TIME, Apr. 3, 1995, at 64 (discussing the controversy arising from the
Russian display of a portion of the trove).
4 The Elgin Marbles are portions of the frieze, metatopes, and pediments
of the Parthenon in Athens that were removed by a British subject between
1801 and 1812. See John Henry Merryman, Thinking About the Elgin Marbles,
83 MICH. L. REv. 1881, 1882-84, 1897 (1985). The Marbles were subsequently
sold to the British Museum, where they continue to be displayed. See id. at
1882. In the early 1980s, the Greek government unsuccessfully attempted to
reacquire the Marbles. See id. The controversy continues, however, as to
which country is entitled to possession of the Marbles. See id.
Such possessory disputes are not uncommon; other well-known examples
include Montezuma's Aztec headdress held in Vienna and various masterpieces
in the Prado that were taken during Spain's seventeenth century occupation of
the Netherlands. See Deloris Tarzan Ament, A Compelling Portrait of-Art, War
and Politics, SEATTLE TIMES, Dec. 17, 1995, at M2.
- Karl E. Meyer, Editorial Notebook: Russia's Hidden Attic; Returning the
Spoils of World War II, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 1995, at A20.
6 Amei Wallach, Russia, Art and Spoils of War, NEWSDAY, Jan. 24, 1995,
at B7 (quoting Irina Antonova, Director of the Pushkin Museum).
7 Will Englund, Russia Unveils Seized Masterpieces, BALTIMORE SUN, Feb.
10, 1995, at IA.
8 See infra section 2 (discussing the history of the trove).
' The Pushkin Museum later presented other related exhibitions, including
"Five Centuries of European Drawing," held in October, 1995. See Mark
Almond, The Art of Cashing in on Nazi Treasures, DAILY MAIL, Oct. 21, 1995,
at 12. This exhibit consisted of 307 sketches and drawings by such artists as
Diirer, Holbein, Mantegna, and Rembrandt. See id. Pushkin curators credited
the exhibit as "the former collection of Franz Koenigs," a German Jew who
owned the drawings before they were seized by the Nazis and ultimately taken
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Petersburg's Hermitage Museum, innocuously called "Hidden
Treasures Revealed,"1 ° was greeted with much acclaim by a
delighted art world.11 In contrast, its counterpart in Moscow's
by Soviet soldiers. Id. For a complete catalogue of the Koenigs collection, see
ALBERT J. ELEN, MISSING OLD MASTER DRAWINGS FROM THE FRANZ
KOENIGS COLLECTION CLAIMED BY THE STATE OF THE NETHERLANDS
(1989).
On April 16, 1996, the Pushkin opened the "Trojan Gold" exhibition,
which was scheduled to last one year. See Peter Plagens, The Golden Hoard,
NEWSWEEK, Apr. 8, 1996, at 72. The exhibition consisted of Bronze Age gold
objects excavated by Heinrich Schliemann in 1873 at an archaeological site in
Turkey believed to be the legendary city of Troy. See id. The art was kept in
Germany until 1945, when a German museum director supposedly gave the
gold to the Soviets for protection. See id. at 73. Germany was unhappy with
this exhibition, particularly since some German officials felt that such an
exhibit should have been done in tandem with German museums, which
possess a majority of the collection. See Russia Unveils Trojan Treasures: Exhibit
f WWII 'Trophy'ArtAngers Germany, CHI. TRM., Apr. 16, 1996, S 1, at 4. In
response, the Museum of Pre- and Early History in Berlin presented its own
exhibit of Trojan artifacts. See id. The Hermitage museum has also continued
to exhibit seized art, unveiling a show entitled "Treasures of European
Drawing" in December, 1996. See Meek, supra note 2, at 12.
Much of the Hermitage trove consists of art originally confiscated by the
German government from private German collections, like the Koenigs
collection. See Almond, supra, at 12. This Comment, however, will not
address the return of art to its original owners.
'0 See Stanley Meisler, The Hermitage, SMITHSONIAN, Mar. 1995, at 40, 42.
The exhibit included artwork plundered from private German collections,
including the aforementioned pieces by Degas, Van Gogh, and Renoir. See id.
at 41. Commentators note that some of the paintings "are important works,
and one really is a 'lost' masterpiece, hitherto thought to have been destroyed
and known only through photographs: Edgar Degas's spatially daring, wonder-
fully stylish slice-of-life image called Place de la Concorde.. . . The show also
includes an exquisite Seurat seascape, some notable Cezannes and considerable
paintings by Courbet, Gauguin, Van Gogh and others." Hughes, supra note 3,
at 66.
11 Commentators called the Hermitage show an "old-fashioned blockbust-
er," and 170,000 copies of a "lavish catalogue" detailing the show were printed
by June, 1995. Christopher Knight, Displaying the Spoils of War, L.A. TIMES,
Mar. 20, 1995, at Al. The exhibit was treated by organizers as a gala event of
international scope; Hermitage Museum Director Mikhail Piotrovsky
"extend[ed] invitations to the German consulate and to the families of the
Germans who once owned this art." Weekend Edition: Russian Museum Exbibits
Art Taken From Nazi Germany (National Public Radio broadcast, Apr. 1, 1995);
see also MacKenzie, supra note 1 ("The mood at the Hermitage on Wednesday
was festive. Piotrovsky emphasized the scrupulous restoration work by Russian
specialists, and the high degree of professionalism displayed in the preparation
for the exhibition. This theme was echoed by the acting consul general from
the German Embassy... ."). The exhibition drew 1.5 million visitors and had
its run extended twice. See Meek, supra note 2, at 12.
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Pushkin Museum was entitled "Twice Saved," 12 a more provoca-
tive title whose innuendo provides a hint of the international
controversy ignited by the trove's resurfacing.
Since the reemergence of this trove and its subsequent
exhibition, politicians, art scholars, and journalists have fiercely
debated the economic, legal, political, cultural, and historical issues
attendant to the larger questions implicated by the art's reemer-
gence: where and to whom does it belong? The German govern-
ment 13 and many art commentators 4 argue that the initial
seizure and continued possession of the artwork by Russia violate
international law and modern protocol. The Russian govern-
12 The exhibition, held from February 28 to July 16, 1995, consisted of art
originally from German and Hungarian private and museum collections. See
Gambrell, supra note 1, at 88. The exhibit included paintings by the Master of
the Holy Kindred, Lucas Crabnach the Elder, Veronese and his studio,
Bartholomaeus Bruyn the Elder, Hendrick Ter Bruggen, El Greco, Tintoretto,
George Romney, Vigee-Lebrun, Goya, Corot, Daumier, Manet, Degas, and
Renoir. See id. at 91; see also Jo Ann Lewis, Uncovering a Buried Treasure:
Russians Reveal Two More Long-Lost Art Collections, WASH. POST, Jan. 23, 1995,
at B1 (discussing the portions of the exhibit originally taken by the Nazis from
the Herzog and Hatvany families of Budapest, Hungary).
13 See Meyer, supra note 5, at A20 ("Germany seeks the return of treasures
from its museums, libraries and private collections as part of a reciprocal deal
with Russia."). The German position is well-documented in a series of state-
ments issued by German Ambassador Hagen Graf Lanbsdorff of the Foreign
Office of the Federal Republic of Germany. See Return of Cultural Property:
Hostages of War or Harbingers of Peace-Historical Facts, Political Positions
and an Assessment From the German Point of View Ganuary 1995) [hereinafter
Statement 1995] (on file with the University of Pennsylvania Journal of
International Economic Law); Agreements Between Germany and Russia on the
Return of Cultural Property Removed From Their Countries in Time or as
Consequence of War-The Legal Situation From the German Point of View
(September 1994) [hereinafter Statement 1994] (on file with the University of
Pennsylvania Journal of International Economic Law).
14 See Interview with Constance Lowenthal, Executive Director of the
International Foundation for Art Research, in New York, N.Y. (Dec. 16, 1995)
discussing the Hermitage controversy); see also Meyer, supra note 5, at A20
"[T]o many in the art world, .. . looming ethical question[s] threaten[] to
obscure the aesthetic significance of the Hermitage discovery.").
15 The applicable treaties are the 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection
of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, May 14, 1954, 249
U.N.T.S. 215 [hereinafter Hague 1954], and the 1907 Hague Convention
Respecting Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 1 T.I.A.S. 631
[hereinafter Hague 1907], both of which bar the "confiscation of 'works of art
and science' from territory occupied in war." Knight, supra note 11, at A10.
Also implicated are 1990 and 1992 treaties between Russia and Germany re-
garding "missing or unlawfully removed cultural property." Statement 1994,
supra note 13; see also Meyer, supra note 5, at A20 (noting that the return of the
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ment, however, considers the trove reparations for acts committed
by Germany during World War Hl.16
To date, this debate has yielded no comprehensive solution to
the controversy,17  The complexity of the dispute, and the
disparate interests involved, have contributed to this stalemate.
This Comment attempts to resolve the controversy by analyzing
it through an approach that is both comprehensive and cohesive.
First, each of the perspectives involved in the controversy is
examined, including the economic, legal, historical, cultural, and
political perspectives; then, each perspective is integrated into a
cohesive framework for analysis using the legal perspective as its
foundation. In the process, this Comment demonstrates how a
legal analysis can provide an objective, equitable, simple, and
legitimate method of providing a solution to this complex
problem.
Section 2 reviews the trove's history, from the aftermath of
World War II to the Hermitage exhibit. Section 3 explores each
interest implicated in the controversy, while Section 4 creates a
legal framework that integrates these perspectives. Section 4 also
explores the current applicable legal doctrine, discusses how each
perspective can be considered within a framework rooted in this
doctrine, and details the reasons why such a framework is useful.
Section 5 then uses the legal framework to find a solution to the
controversy that fairly takes each perspective into account.
Finally, Section 6 concludes that an equitable solution such as the
one proposed can make great strides toward healing deep wounds
that have continued to plague Europe since World War II.
disputed works "was the essence of a bilateral agreement [between Germany
and Russia] in 1990 and reconfirmed by President Yeltsin in 1992"); infra
section 3.2 (discussing such statements).
16 See Knight, supra note 11, at A10 ("But the recent nationalist backlash
against any cooperation with the West has many Russians digging in their
heels, insisting that the art be kept as reparations for German war atrocities.").
17 The primary international response thus far has been the formation of
an official commission on restitution, composed of both German and Russian
members. See Charlie Rose: Guests Talk About the Art on Display at the
Hermitage (PBS television broadcast, Oct. 4, 1995) [hereinafter Rose]; see also
infra section 3.2 (discussing the official Russian response). According to
Hermitage director Mikhail Piotrovsky, however, the committee "was making
little progress." Meek, supra note 2, at 12.
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2. THE HISTORY OF THE HERMITAGE TROvE
To art professionals outside Germany the advent of
Nazism and the bizarre goings-on of its art establishment
were regarded at first as a passing phenomenon which
would require some minor adjustments in international
dealings. 8
The foresight of these art professionals proved as keen as that
of Neville Chamberlain when he appeased Adolf Hitler in 1938.
In addition to being a time of human genocide, World War II was
rampant with cultural genocide, as warring nations pillaged and
destroyed cultural treasures throughout Europe.19 German
troops, under Hitler's orders, plundered art from conquered
nations for eventual display in a German "supermuseum."0 In
Russia, the Nazis simply destroyed most of the works they found,
believing the Russians to be an inferior race with treasures
11 LYNN H. NICHOLAS, THE RAPE OF EUROPA 27 (1994) (giving a com-
plete account of the pillaging of art during World War ]).
19 See, e.g., id.
20 See 1 LEONARD F. DUBOFF & SALLY H. CAPLAN, THE DESKBOOK OF
ART LAW D-17 to D-21 (2d ed. 1993). While much of the art plundered by the
Germans during the war was returned to its original owners and nations,
efforts to recover art stolen by Nazi troops persist. See John Tagliabue, Armed
With List, Italy Artworks Looted by Nazis, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 1995, at 8
(describing attempts by collectors and officials in Italy to acquire stolen
artwork). The current German government acknowledges the widespread
pillaging by the Third Reich, noting that, "[w]hen German soldiers crossed the
Bug in 1941... the services behind the occupation army included not only the
notorious task forces which killed people but also art historians in uniform
who hunted down cultural property f6r Rosenberg, G6ring and Himmler."
Statement 1995, supra note 13, § I, at 1.
The German government continues to search for and return art stolen
from Allied nations during the war. See id. S I-IV ("In spring 1994 Federal
Chancellor Kohl returned to [French] President Mitterrand 28 important works
of art which had been taken from France to Germany during the war in
unknown circumstances."). Other art misappropriated during World War 1
continues to reappear throughout the world. See, e.g., David Colker, Long
Search Ends in Fight Over Degas Painting, L.A. TIMES, July 19, 1996, at B1 (de-
scribing a dispute over ownership of a painting between a Dutch family from
whom the painting was taken during World War II and an art collector who
later purchased the painting).
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unworthy of salvation. 1
As the tide of the war changed, the Soviet Army,2 under
2' As they marched through Russia towards St. Petersburg, German troops
pillaged countless cultural sites. See Knight, supra note 11, at A10. Commenta-
tors note that "National Socialist ideology regarded Slavic people as inferior, so
Russia was a target not merely to be conquered-it was to be cleansed, and then
Germanized." Yd. See also NICHOLAS, supra note 18, at 186-201 (giving a
complete account of the Nazi pillage of Russia). Some paintings, however,
were taken rather than destroyed, and Russia claims that it is still missing
200,000 pieces of art. See David Mazie, Spoils of War: Display of Art Seized in
Battle Sparks Debate, CHLI. TRIB., Feb. 19, 1995, S 13, at 21.
" Other Allied nations generally did not follow Russia's lead, although
some soldiers confiscated some artwork on their own, most notoriously the
Quedlinburg treasures. See Claudia Fox, Note, The Unidroit Convention on
Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects: An Answer to the World Problem of
Illicit Trade in Cultural Property, 9 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 225, 227 (1993)
(discussing the Quedlinburg treasures); William H. Honan, U.S. Revives Art
Theft Case, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 1997, at C8 (discussing the continuing legal
resolution of the Quedlinburg case); William H. Honan, Abrupt End to a Case
of Looted Treasures, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 1996, at C13 (discussing the
Quedlinburg case); William H. Honan, 3 Are Indicted in Sale of German Art
Stolen by a G.L, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 5, 1996, at A10 [hereinafter Honan, 3 Are
Indicted] (detailing the theft of the Quedlinburg treasures from Germany by an
American soldier in 1945).
Likewise, some American leaders were interested in cultural reparations.
At one conference of Allied leaders in Berlin, U.S. representatives recommend-
ed returning all art plundered by Germany, while retaining art that is the
"bona fide property of the German nation." NICHOLAS, supra note 18, at 385.
Specific recommendations included holding the art in "trusteeship for return to
te German nation when it has re-earned its right to be considered as a nation."
Id.
Strong protests by American art historians and museum officials ended
such consideration. The most notable protest was by a group of Monuments,
Fine Arts and Archives Specialist Officers of the Armed Forces of the United
States, who prepared a protest statement popularly known as the "Weisbaden
Manifesto" in late 1945. See NICHOLAS, supra note 18, at 394. The officers
stated that they "unanimously agreed that the transportation of those works of
art, undertaken by the United States Army, u on direction from the highest
national authority, establishes a precedent which is neither morally tenable nor
trustworthy." Protest Written on 7 November 1946 by MFAA Officers in the
office of Walter Farmer in Weisbaden [hereinafter Weisbaden Manifesto] (on
file with the University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Economic Law);
see also NICHOLAS, supra note 18, at 394-95 (discussing the protest by the
MFAA officers).
The United States and Great Britain eventually pursued a policy of
"restitution in hand," under which cultural objects were returned to their pre-
war country of ownership. See Gambrell, supra note 1, at 88. A show of
confiscated paintings, however, appeared at the National Gallery of Art in
Washington, D.C. and in museums throughout the nation to raise money for
German children; the art was subsequently returned to Germany's Dahle
Museum. See NICHOLAS, supra note 18, at 401-405.
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Josef Stalin's orders, engaged in their own plundering, employing
special brigades responsible for pillaging, "trophy art" from
German museums and private collections. The trove gathered
by the Soviets eventually included approximately 2.5 million
pieces of artwork and 10 million books and manuscripts. 24 For
decades, this cache sat untouched in the basements of Russian
museums.' Despite the eventual return of some 1.5 million
items to East Germany in the 1950s, 26 the Soviet government hid
the rest of the trove, rumored to exist but never seen, during the
23 See Knight, supra note 11, at A10. Historians note that "[ais the Soviet
Army advanced across Eastern Europe toward Berlin, so-called 'trophy
commissions' of art professionals were dispatched from Moscow with theexpress purpose of collecting art, archives and books and arranging for their
transport back to the Soviet Union." Gambrell, supra note 1, at 88. See
generally KONSTANTIN AKINSHA & GRIGORII KOZLOV, BEAUTIFUL LOOT:
THE SOVIET PLUNDER OF EuRoPE'S ART TREASURES (1995) (providing a
complete account of the Soviet plunder); NICHOLAS, supra note 18, at 327-68
(describing the Soviet plunder of German art).
The reasons for the Russian plundering ranged from concern for artwork
and opportunism on the part of individual soldiers to a desire for reparations
due to Russian anger at the destruction of their own culture by the Germans."
Hughes, supra note 3, at 65. Some historians claim that Stalin, like Hitler, had
"a long-secret program dating from 1943 to build and stock a new
'supermuseum' with art looted from all over Europe." Ralph Blumenthal, A
Glimpse ofRussia's Wartime Art Booty, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Jan. 24, 1995. But
see Hughes, supra note 3, at 65 ("Josef Stalin had no set plans to create a
centralized supermuseum of war loot, though there is some evidence that he
entertained the idea.").
24 See Hughes, supra note 3, at 65. The contents of the trove ranged "from
Gutenberg Bibles, to Impressionist paintings once in German private
collections, to the 260 gold and silver objects that, though actually pre-
Homeric, were dubbed 'The Treasure of Priam' after they were excavated by
Heinrich Schliemann from the site of Troy." Id4
" See Almond, supra note 9, at 12 ("Much of the plunder was hidden
behind a steel door in the Pushkin's basement."). According to Albert
Kostenevich, Curator of the Hermitage, "about 10,000 items were left in the
Hermitage in secret storages." Rose, supra note 17.
26 See Rose, supra note 17; see also Gambrell, supra note 1, at 89 ("The
restitution was orchestrated with great fanfare, to maximize its political capital.
The Pushkin Museum in Moscow mounted a blockbuster exiibition in 1955
that included Raphael's Sistine Madonna ... after which the art was re-
turned."); Statement 1995, supra note 13, S III ("In the 1950s the Soviet Union
decided to return to its brother nation the GDR some of the German cultural
property it had requisitioned."). The Hermitage itself possessed 829,000 of
these items in 1945, and Hermitage curators claim that all but approximately
10,000 of the items were returned to East Germany during the 1950s. See Rose,
supra note 17.
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Cold War.Y
With the fall of communism in the Soviet Union and East
Germany, Russia and a reunited Germany signed treaties in
1990 and 1992,29 each pledging that stolen works of art would
be returned to their original owners.3" Almost immediately after
the signing of these pacts, the Hermitage trove slowly began to
emerge into view from the museums' dusty storage rooms. In
1992, the Hermitage displayed Old Master and Modern drawings
originally taken from a museum in Bremen, Germany.31 In
February, 1995, the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation seized
three more paintings originally in the Bremen collection from a
Russian immigrant offering them for sale on the open market.32
This slow trickle of paintings grew into a flood of controversy
in 1995, when the Hermitage and Pushkin museums each unveiled
significant portions of the long-hidden trove. On February 28,
Pushkin officials opened "Twice Saved," a hastily-prepared33
' See Rose, supra note 17 (discussing rumors of artwork hidden underneath
Russian museums).
28 The 1990 treaty, the "Treaty on Good Neighbourliness, Partnership and
Cooperation (the Good-Neighboirliness Treaty)," was one of "a number of
historic multilateral decisions terminating the East-West confrontation, ranging
from the 'Two-plus-four Treaty' between the former occupying powers anythe
two German states ... to the adoption of the 'Charter of Paris for a New
Europe' at the CSCE summit on 21 November 1990." Statement 1994, supra
note 13, para. 4. Article 16 of the treaty states that:
The Federal Republic of Germany and the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics will seek to ensure the preservation of cultural treasures of
the other side in their territory. They agree that missing or unlawfully
removed art treasures which are located in their territory will be
returned to the owners or their legal successors.
Id. para. 7.
29 Article 15 of the German-Russian Cultural Agreement of 1992 states that
"[tjhe contracting parties agree that missing or unlawfully removed cultural
property which is located in their territory will be returned to their owners or
their legal successors." Id.
"o See Russian Parliament Bans Return of Stolen Art Works, DEUTSCHE
PRESSE-AGENTUR, Apr. 21, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, Non-US
File [hereinafter Russian] (discussing the treaties).
" See Knight, supra note 11, at A10.
32 See id.
" See Gambrell, supra note 1, at 91 ("In late February, just weeks after the
New York conference [on the artwork], much to everyone's surprise, the
Pushkin hastily opened 'Twice Saved.'"). Much of the Russian press was
cynical about the motives of Pushkin director Irina Antonova, seeing the haste
as signifying her "main objective... to set the tone of public discussion about
19971
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exhibit showcasing sixty-three so-called "lost" paintings,m a full
one-sixth of the Pushkin's collection of appropriated art.35
Exactly one month later, the Hermitage presented "Hidden
Treasures Revealed," a carefully planned and marketed exhibit
aimed at avoiding political controversy.36 Commentators hailed
the Hermitage exhibit as "the event of the century,"37 and the
international art community applauded the removal of the art's
veil of secrecy.3
8
Despite their popular and critical success, 39 the exhibits
reopened old wounds left from the War and ignited debate about
the legality and morality of Russia's possession of the art.'
Citing a body of international treaties dating back to the turn of
the century,41 Germany demanded the return of the artwork.42
the art and to upstage the Hermitage exhibition." Id. at 95. Unlike their
Hermitage counterparts, Antonova and her colleagues conducted their
preparations in secrecy, did not produce a catalogue, and did not inform
German officials of the exhibit in advance. See id. at 94 (contrasting the
Pushkin and Hermitage exhibits).
' See id. at 91-93 (discussing these paintings in detail).
3' See id. at 91 ("The museum announced that the show represented
approximately one sixth of the disputed paintings remaining in its collection.").
36 In contrast to Antonova, Hermita~,e director Mikhail Piotrovsky
"demonstrated considerable diplomatic aplomb, managing to avoid antagonizing
Russian pblic opinion. while earning the museum a great deal of international
good will. Id. at 94. A catalogue was distributed, the Western press lavished
the exhibit with advance press, and Hermitage officials "treated the Germans
as partners rather than enemies and kept them informed at every stage in the
preparations. German cultural officials, foreign museum directors ... and
various heirs to the German private collections who were in St. Petersburg to
press their claims, were all invited to a gala opening banquet." Id. at 94.
" George Myers, Jr., Exhibit Adds Epilogue to Volume on Art Theft,
COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Mar. 25, 1995, at 3E.
" See Lark Borden, 50-Year-Old Secrets at Hermitage: Here Are 74 'Stolen"
Masterpieces, GANNETT NEWS SERVICE, Apr. 5, 1995, available in LEXIS, News
Library, GNS File (discussing how the Hermitage exhibit sent a "wave of
exaltation through the global art community").
39 Although the Hermitage exhibit got the majority of international
attention, see Hughes, supra note 3 (analyzing the entire controversy only after
the Hermitage exhibit began), the Pushkin exhibit was also well received, with
long lines of visitors and commentators who noted that "the paintings on view
at the Pushkin ... generally appear[ed] to be in excellent condition."
Gambrell, supra note 1, at 91.
40 See generally Hughes, supra note 3 (discussing the Hermitage controver-
sy).
41 Specifically, the 1907 and 1954 Hague Conventions, supra note 15.
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The Russian parliament subsequently took action to prevent such
restitution,43 claiming that Russia was entitled to reparations for
the damage caused by Germany during World War II. Despite
the formation of an official commission on restitution composed
of German and Russian officials,4" the debate has thus far yielded
no resolution.
3. A MULTI-LAYERED CONTROVERSY
A major obstacle to a resolution is the complexity of the
controversy. Although primarily treated by the media as the
subject of a "huge diplomatic row,"4 the debate over the Hermit-
age trove implicates historical, political, economic, cultural, and,
ultimately, legal concerns. This section discusses the first four
perspectives on the controversy.
3.1. Historical Sentiments
The Hermitage trove holds a deep emotional resonance for
both nations involved, invoking nationalistic pride and vengeful
anger fifty years after the fall of Berlin. "Twice Saved" and
"Hidden Treasures Revealed" were more than exhibitions; for
many Russians, they were affirmations of Russia's strength, fueled
by memories of past victory in war.47 When "Twice Saved"
opened, Pushkin Museum Director Irina Antonova proudly
proclaimed, "[t]hose of us who know what fascist Germany did to
our national heritage, how they destroyed hundreds of thousands
of statues and paintings, more than 400 museums, entire cities...
think such a loss demands compensation."48 One account of the
exhibition's opening noted that Antanova's words, "even after a
42 For a complete articulation of the German position, see Statement 1994
and Statement 1995, supra note 13.
41 See infra section 3.2 (discussing Russian action regarding the trove).
4 See id.
s See Rose, supra note 17.
" Almond, supra note 9, at 12.
o See Gambrell, supra note 1, at 95 ("[M]any Russians feel that the Soviet
victory [over the Nazis] is the last unsullied spark of glory to which they can
proudly and undisputably [sic] lay claim. Anything that is perceived to
challenge that glory-however indirectly-rubs salt into an already woundednational pride.").
48 Russia, with Feeling Displays Its Booty, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Mar.
13, 1995, at 11.
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half century of peace, drew applause from the museum's work-
ems."
49
Such sentiments stem from the German siege on Russia that
began in June, 1941 and lasted nearly three years.-I During that
time, more than 20 million Russians were slaughtered, 1 and 1200
churches, 500 synagogues, and 500 museums were destroyed .
2
Monuments across Russia pay homage to those who lost their
lives in the war," and some Russians still believe that they were
never duly compensated for the wartime damage- 4  Thus,
Russians argue, the nation is entitled to continued possession of
the art. 5 Artwork as a means of compensation seems particular-
ly appropriate, considering the sheer number of cultural artifacts
seized from Russia by Nazi troops and Hitler's plans to display
the works in a massive museum.56 Such emotions run deep
among Russians, and from a historical standpoint, their continued
possession of the Hermitage trove seems entirely appropriate.
57
Germans, however, do not share these sentiments." Many
Germans feel that the war is in the past and that Germany is now
a democracy that has earned the right to be free of the vestiges of
the Third Reich.5 9 German officials deny the validity of Russian
sentimental arguments and instead point to the international law
49 Id.
50 See Knight, supra note 11, at A10.
s1 See Christopher Knight, Palace Intrigue, L.A. TIMES, May 7, 1995, at C-6.
52 See Gambrell, supra note 1, at 88.
" See Interview with Constance Lowenthal, supra note 14.
14 See Knight, supra note 11, at A10.
55 This argument weakens, however, when considering paintings not
actually owned by Germans during the war. For instance, some commentators
note that "a large number of French paintings. . . were among those seized by
the Soviet army." Gambrell, supra note 1, at 92.
" See Catherine Foster, Stolen Art as War Booty: Hostages or Harbingers of
Peace?, CHRISTIAN SC. MONITOR, Feb. 8, 1995, at 1.
s7 See, e.g., id. ("Some [Russians] argue that the artworks are just compensa-
tion for the killing of 20 million Russians."); jo Durden-Smith, Russia Deserves
Art Booty, MOScOW TIMES, Apr. 18, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Non-US File ("It's time, then, to stop excoriating the Russians-who, after all,
suffered more than any other nation during the war.").
s See Statement 1994, supra note 13, at 8-10; Statement 1995, supra note 13,
at 2.
" See Gambrell, supra note 1, at 120 ("Germany is now a changed,
democratic country and should not be linked in permanent penance to its
past.").
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favoring their position.' °  Regardless, Russia's sentimental
arguments have both captivated her citizens and engendered the
sympathy of many outside Russia."
3.2. Political Concerns
Russian politicians are attempting to build on this strong
sentiment in an attempt to promote public faith in a deeply
troubled government. When Russia and Germany signed
agreements in 1990 and 1992 to return cultural artifacts,62 Russia
became swept up in a "moment of 'euphoria' over the Cold War's
end."6 This enthusiasm, however, has since faded. The imple-
mentation of capitalism in Russia has led to chronic unemploy-
ment, economic instability, and subsequent popular opposition to
cooperation with the West.6" In an attempt to stem this unpopu-
larity and gain from the nationalistic fervor arising out of the
Hermitage controversy," the Russian Parliament passed a
resolution imposing a temporary ban on any restitution of the
Hermitage trove to its original owners.66
60 See Hughes, supra note 3, at 67 ("[Tlhe two sides approach the issue from
drastically different perspectives: 'While the Germans cite legal arguments, the
Russians cite historical responsibility.'").
61 See Suzanne Muchnic, On the Trail of Spoils of War, L.A. TIMES, June 4,
1995, at 10 (discussing the opinion of Otto Wittmann, a trustee emeritus of the
J. Paul Getty Trust and prominent member of the art community).
62 See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text (discussing the treaties).
63 Knight, supra note 11, at A10.
6 See id.
65 Russian Culture Minister Yevgeny Sidorov is among those politicians
vehement in their opposition to returning the artwork. See Russian Minister
Hits Out at German Claims Over Stolen Art, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, July 11,
1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, Non-US File. Sidorov claims the art
as restitution for war crimes, stating that "[t]hirty Russian towns were wiped
from the face of the earth, hundreds of museums were pillaged or reduced to
ashes .... Who will compensate these losses?" Id. There have, however,
been some recent token gestures on the Russian government's part to return
the artwork. For instance, "[Boris] Yeltsin personally returned two paintings
to Hungary in 1993, and ... Sidorov . . . recently handed over several rare
books from the Gotha library to German foreign minister Klaus Kinkel."
Gambrell, supra note 1, at 90.
66 See Russian, supra note 30; see also MacKenzie, supra note 1 (discussing
the Russian bill). The Russian parliament also considered legislation "that
would make all 'lawfully removed' art works-i.e., works that were taken from
Germany by order of the Soviet Zone commander-the property of the Russian
Federation." Gambrell, supra note 1, at 93. The law would have effectively
placed tremendous restrictions on any future return of the portions of the
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Other nations" claim the resolution contravenes the previous
German-Russian treaties' as well as statements by the commis-
sion investigating the Hermitage controversy.' 9 Despite such
diplomatic dilemmas, commentators note that "those [Russians]
critical of the parliament's position are now being attacked as
unpatriotic 'traitors' who have sold out to the West."70
Seemingly less important to Russian officials are the interna-
tional political ramifications of their actions. The Russian-
German treaties,71 the formation of the Russian-German commis-
sion,72 and Boris Yeltsin's return to Hungary of paintings from
the trove in 1993' 3 demonstrate that Russia is concerned with the
consequences the Hermitage controversy could have on its
standing in the international community. Nonetheless, Russia's
retention of a great majority of the trove is straining relations
with Germany 4 and with other nations. 7 Although interna-
trove. See Russian Parliament Restricts Handover of WW2 Booty, REUTERs, July
7, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, Non-US File. The upper house of
the Russian Parliament, however, rejected the proposed law in July. See Gareth
Jones, Russia Unveils Drawings Seized as Nazi War Booty, REUTERS, Dec. 3,
1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, Non-US File.
67 See supra note 13 (discussing the German point of view); Knight, supra
note 11, at A10 (noting the international criticism of the Russian laws
preventing the return of the trove). The U.S. government, however, has stayed
neutral so far. In April, 1996, President Clinton visited "Hidden Treasures
Revealed," escorted by Mikhail Piotrovsky. See Paul Basken, Clinton Tours St.
Petersburg, UPI, Apr. 19, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, UPI File.
Clinton refused to side with either party, although he acknowledged that it was
"'a very big issue.'" Id.
68 See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text (discussing the Russian-
German treaties).
69 The commission stated in March, 1994, that "[t]he two sides agree that
... the subject of the work of the Joint Commission are [sic] those items of
cultural property which were taken from their respective countries during or
as a consequence of the Second World War." Statement 1994, supra note 13,
at 3 (quoting paragraph 5 of the Moscow Protocol of March 24, 1994).
70 Gambrell, supra note 1, at 95.
71 See Statement 1994, supra note 13, at 2 ("Politically, the 1990 treaties
were and continue to be a whole in that they manifest a new identity of
political intent, envisage a programme of comprehensive cooperation, and seek
to establish a new relationship of broad-based partnership.".
72 See supra note 69 and accompanying text (discussing the commission).
3 See supra note 65.
74 See Statement 1995, supra note 13, at 5-6 (discussing the importance of
proper restitution for the sake of good relations between the nations); see also
Lee Hockstader, Russia Unveils Exhibit of WWII Cache, WASH. POST, Feb. 10,
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tional cooperation is crucial to Russia's attempts to secure an
important position on the world stage, 6 Russian politicians
appear to be responding more to a desire for domestic public
approval than to threats of international estrangement.
The German government also has political concerns, both
domestic and international in scope, arising out of the Hermitage
controversy. Return of the art would prove popular with
Germans eager to put World War I behind them,77 as well as
with the original owners of the treasures.7' Furthermore,
complying with German popular will would satisfy the interna-
tional community, given the nearly worldwide support for the
return of the Hermitage trove.7 9 For Germany, therefore, the
political ramifications of this controversy are straightforward. 0
The two nations' conflicting political motivations, however, help
prevent a resolution to the debate.
3.3. Economic Ramifications
For the Hermitage and Pushkin museums, returning the art
would be akin to slaying the proverbial golden goose. Russia's
1995, at BI (noting the statement by Germany's consul general that "[ilt is
poisonous for bilateral and international relations").
' See Foster, supra note 56, at 1 ("[ln the interests of being an effective
player in the new Europe, Russia must give the art back.").
76 See Who Owns This Art?, PROVIDENCE J.-BULL., May 9, 1995, at 12A ("It
is important for Russia's move toward democracy that it begin to form the
habit of abiding by the law, and honor the Hague Convention."). Russia has
a particular interest in maintaining strong ties with Germany, which happens
to be Russia's largest foreign aid donor. See Jack Kelley, The Spoils of War,
USA TODAY, Mar. 3, 1995, at 1D.
7 See James 0. Jackson, The New Germany Flexes its Muscles, TIME, Apr.
13, 1992, at 34, 35 ("[T]he German inclination is to savor success without
dwelling on the past.").
78 See Almond, supra note 9, at 12 (noting that "Franz Koenigs's surviving
grandchildren would like to get the drawings back too").
71 See Knight, supra note 11, at A10 (noting the international criticism of
the Russian laws that prevent the return of the paintings).
" Germany also has an interest in maintaining good relations with Russia;
as one commentator has noted, "Chancellor Helmet Kohl's government is
attempting to prevent the looted art from becoming a ... disrupting factor in
ties with Moscow." Leon Mangasarian, Kinkel: Return of Stolen Art Works a
Test' for German-Russian Ties, DEUTSCHE PRESSE-AGENTUR, Mar. 2, 1995,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Non-US File.
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uncertain economic situation"1 and the transition from a paternal-
istic government to a free market system have dramatically
drained the fiscal wells of Russian museums.8 2 The Hermitage
finds itself in a particularly precarious position, since its financial
troubles may threaten its position among the top tier of the
world's art museums. 3 Opening its doors to the West after
decades of Communist rule, the museum is in the midst of a
worldwide campaign to raise $400 million for modernization and
restoration. 4 Despite the Hermitage's preeminence in the art
world, the museum is outdated and desperately in need of this
renovation. 5
The trove can provide a remedy to these financial problems.
The Hermitage's share of the art is valued at approximately $1
billion, 6 and the total value of Russia's holdings is estimated at
$6.4 billion. Furthermore, the proceeds from ticket sales for
such a major exhibition, as well as from prints, brochures, and
other souvenirs," can reach millions of dollars.8 9  An interna-
Si See Jo Ann Lewis, The Art that Came Out of the Woodwork, WASH.
POST, Feb. 14, 1995, at B1 (noting the current economic problems in Russia);
Knight, supra note 11, at A10 (describing Russia's economy as "desperately
strapped").
82 See Wallach, supra note 6, at B7 ("It is no secret that Soviet museums are
desperately in need of funds."); Meisler, supra note 10, at 43 ("[T]he Hermitage
[is] strapped for funds because of the cut in government subsidies since the end
of Soviet rule."). The Russian government currently supplies between sixty and
seventy percent of the Hermitage's annual budget, and the rest must be secured
through other means. See Knight, supra note 11, at A10. For details of the
Hermitage's most recent economic problems, see Carol Vogel, A Friendly
Touch, to Aid the Hermitage, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 1996, at 13; Elizabeth
Williamson, A Crippled Giant, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 17, 1996, at C1.
13 See Meisler, supra note 10, at 42 (comparing the Hermitage to the
Louvre, the Prado, and the Metropolitan Museum of Art).
814 See id. at 43.
85 See id. ("The museum's problems range from poor lighting to inadequate
tourist information to lack of space to questionable security. Most of the
paintings ... are guarded by grandmotherly babushkas, some wearing house
slippers. A Rembrandt was badly damaged in 1985 by a crazed attacker
wielding a knife and sulfuric acid.").
86 See Hockstader, supra note 74, at B1.
87 See id.
88 Commentators note that "[a] lavish catalogue, the potential for exhibition
souvenirs and a global museum tour ... may all be sources of income."
Knight, supra note 11, at A10. Such souvenirs range from notecards to
calendars. See id.
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tional tour of the artwork could provide another source of
revenue for the Hermitage and other Russian museums, much like
the heralded traveling exhibition of impressionist and post-
impressionist works did for the Barnes Foundation in Pennsylva-
niaY° The presence of such art also impacts fundraising efforts
by raising international interest in the museums and encouraging
donations9'1
Given the significant economic rewards that come with
control of the trove, German museums have the same economic
incentives for securing the art as do their Russian counterparts.
Thus, both German and Russian institutions have much to gain
from possession of the artwork, and these financial considerations
and incentives further complicate the controversy.92
3.4. The Best Interest of the Artwork
Members of the art community are primarily concerned with
11 See Wendy Sloane, Russians Unveil Disputed Paintings, CHRISTIAN Sci.
MONITOR, Feb. 10, 1995, at 13 ("'We are talking many millions [of dollars]
because we are talking major pictures.") (quoting James Randall, head of
Christie's Impressionist Department in London) (alteration in original).
Another part of the trove is King Priam's 5,000-year-old golden treasure
unearthecfin Turkey in the 19th Century. See Wallach, supra note 6, at B7; see
also supra note 10. Commentators note that an exhibit of such art could possi-
bly "rival the King Tutankhamen blockbuster of the '70s in appeal." Wallach,
supra note 6, at B7. But see Lynnley Browning, Russian Museum to Show Art
Seized in World War II, REUTERS, Feb. 7, 1995, available in LEXIS, News
Library, Non-US File ("Although the Hermitage exhibition will attract
hundreds of visitors, it will not... bring the cash-strapped museum the money
it desperately needs.").
9o The Barnes Foundation, located in suburban Philadelphia, sent many of
its most famous holdings on a very successful international tour in 1993-95 in
order to raise funds needed to renovate the dilapidated building which housed
the Foundation's artwork. See, e.g., Leonard W. Boasberg, Founder's Orders
Stand, Barnes Foundation Told, PHILA. INQUIRER, Sept. 22, 1995, at B2 (noting
that the Barnes tour raised more than $16 million for renovations); Where
There's a Will, ECONOMIST, Aug. 1, 1992, at 77 (noting the financial incentives
behind the Barnes tour).
91 See Corbeil, supra note 90, at 62 (discussing the attention received by
museums holding popular exhibitions).
92 A tangential economic concern exists among private collectors in Russia.
Many worry that a government restitution policy might lead, more invidiously,
to the government plundering private collections. See Gambrell, supra note 1,
at 94.
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accessibility to and preservation of the art. 3 Working in Russia's
favor in this regard is the fact that, despite its financial prob-
lems,94 the Hermitage is a museum of international prestige95
and thus a fitting forum for the exhibition of the trove. Concen-
trating the art in the Hermitage, as well as in the Pushkin, creates
a convenient and grand setting for international adulation. These
museums have also kept the paintings intact and undamaged for
fifty years96 and will presumably continue this preservation in
the future. However, St. Petersburg and other Russian locations
are not especially accessible or "tourist-friendly," and such a
location might deter public access to some degree.7
In comparison, Germany has a far more stable economy and
government,98 and thus might be in a stronger position than
Russia to preserve the art. Furthermore, Germany has many
appropriate venues, all well-respected within the art community,
in which to properly preserve and showcase the trove.99 Thus,
both sides can legitimately argue that they are the best potential
guardian of the artwork; however, determining which location
93 See PAUL M. BATOR, THE INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN ART 18-34
(Midway Reprint ed., 1988) (discussing these two fundamental values).
94 See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
9' See supra note 83.
96 One commentator was "completely bowled over... [by the artwork's]
condition. [One painting] looked as if it had been painted this morning." Rose,
supra note 17. Another commentator notes that "the museum's conservators
had monitored the condition of the art and taken restoration measures when
necessary. And indeed, the paintings on view at the Pushkin, like those at the
Hermitage, generally appear to be in excellent condition." Gambrell, supra
note 1, at 91. But see Interview with Constance Lowenthal, supra note 14
(noting that the museums' treatment of the art might be more akin to "benign
neglect" than active preservation).
9 See Borden, supra note 38 ("St. Petersburg is not exactly the most tourist-
friendly destination resort on Earth, with its ever-changing Russian visa
requirements, crime rates and black markets and trying to keep up with ever-
vascillating [sic] exchange rates.").
98 See Rudi Dornbusch, Back to the Gold Standard? Only in Steve Forbes's
Dreams, BUS. WK., Feb. 19, 1996, at 16 (noting Germany's low inflation);
Thomas Sancton, Is this a Crossroads-Or the Edie ofa Cli.f?, TIME, Dec. 11,
1995, at 58 (discussing a "strong, united Germany"); Single-Currency-Minded,
ECONOMIST, Dec. 23, 1995, at 61 (discussing Germany's influence in the
European Union and the tough economic standards that all members of the
European Union, including Germany, must meet).
9' See Margarita Tupitsyn, Shaping Soviet Art, ART IN AM., Sept. 1994, at
41, 41 ("[I]n the late '80s, German museums and galleries enthusiastically led the
way in organizing major historical and contemporary exhibitions.").
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best promotes the interests of the public and the artwork itself
must be considered in resolving the controversy.
4. CREATING A FRAMEWORK BASED ON A CENTURY OF LAW
The final perspective on the Hermitage controversy is the
legality of Russia's possession. International law prohibits the
wartime pillaging of cultural treasures and demands the restitution
of such goods to their original owners.1°  This section both
explains this body of law and creates a framework, based on the
legal doctrine, from which a solution to the Hermitage controver-
sy can be fashioned. This section first discusses the applicable law.
A summary of both nations' legal perspectives follows. Finally,
this section explains how this legal foundation can integrate all
previously-discussed perspectives to create a solution that is not
only fair to both nations, but also logically considers and satisfies
all perspectives on the controversy.
4.1. A Century of Law
1 °1
The image of the swashbuckling soldier, marching over
devastated territory in search of spoils of battle, pervades histo-
ry.l02 Pillaging during wartime was rampant during the days of
the Roman Empire 03 and has continued ever since.x°4  Since
the nineteenth century, attempts to stop such looting have been
just as common.
Early efforts at limiting and regulating pillaging include the
United States' Lieber Code,01 the Conference of Brussels in
10 See infra section 4.1 (detailing the history of this body of law).
101 See generally M. Catherine Vernon, Note, Common Cultural Property:
The Search for Rights of Protective Intervention, 26 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
435, 454-57 (1994) (detailing pre-1954 efforts to prevent such pillaging).
102 See George Myers, Jr., Exhibit Adds Epilogue to Volume on Art Theft,
COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Mar. 25, 1995, at 3E (ioting this swashbuckling image
of pillaging).
103 See 1 DUBOFF & CAPLAN, supra note 20, at D-3.
104 See 1 id. at D-3 to D-8 (describing various instances of looting by the
Roman Empire, by Spain during the exploration of the Americas, and by
France during Napoleon's reign). Such pillaging continues to occur in modern
times, most recently during Saddam Hussein's siege on Kuwait and in the
current Balkan War. See Foster, supra note 56, at 18.
10' See 1 DUBOFF & CAPLAN, supra note 20, at D-9. The 1863 code, which
governed army conduct on the battlefield, "provided for a determination of
ownership by treaty after war in the few situations where the code allowed the
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1874,106 and the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907."07
While the Lieber Code applied only to conflicts within and
wholly concerning the United States, the other pacts marked the
beginning of an international attempt to curb wartime looting.
The 1907 Hague Convention provided, as did its 1899 predecessor,
a framework for the "Protection of Cultural Property in the
Event of Armed Conflict and Protocol Conflict." 08  The 1907
Convention outlined the basic principles that all signatories
intended to govern situations where pillaging and destruction of
cultural treasures were likely t 9
seizure of art objects." Id. The code was based on a field manual prepared by
a Columbia College professor for use by Union military commanders in the
Civil War. See 1 JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN & ALBERT E. ELSEN, LAW,
ETHIcS AND THE VISUAL ARTS 14 (2d ed. 1987); see also Vernon, supra note
101, at 455 (chronicling Professor Francis Lieber's preparation of the
"Instructions for the Governance of Armies of the United States in the Field,"
which, in part, "provided for the protection of cultural property").
106 See 1 DUBoFF & CAPLAN, supra note 20, at D-10. This treaty "stated
that establishments devoted to the arts, whether or not belonging to the state,
should be treated as private property and that seizure or destruction of such
establishments should be prosecuted by the competent authorities. Private
property should not be confiscated and pillage was prohibited." Id. The treaty
was never formally adopted and hence not binding on the parties. See 1
MERRYMAN & ELsEN, supra note 105, at 14. Ironically, Russia was responsible
for initiating the convention. See id.
107 See 1 DUBOFF & CAPLAN, supra note 20, at D-10. The 1899 and 1907
Hague Conventions are regarded as the "first formal establishment of guidelines
for the 'Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict and
Protocol Conflict.'" Id. The 1899 conference, organized at the initiative of the
Russian government, involved twenty-six nations and resulted in several
treaties: a Convention on Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, a
Convention on Laws and Customs of War on Land, and most notably,
"Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land." Id. Article
56 of the latter treaty provides that:
The property of the communes, that of religious, charitable, and
educational institutions, and those of art and science, even when State
property, shall be treated as private property.
All seizure of, and destruction, or intentional damage done to such
institutions, to historical monuments, works of art or science, is
prohibited, and should be made the subject of proceedings.
1 MERRYMAN & ELSEN, supra note 105, at 14-15.
10I 1 DuBOFF & CAPLAN, supra note 20, at D-10.
109 See 1 id. at D-11 (noting that the convention "set forth the basic
principles that all interested parties hoped would govern situations that in the
past had wrought such destruction upon many of the world's treasures").
Among the treaty's key provisions were:
Article 46
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What the nations aspired to on paper, however, did not
correspond with their actions. Although ratified by most major
Western powers, 10 the 1907 treaty was largely ineffectual during
World War I." Nations generally ignored the terms of the
treaty, and the casualties of the "Great War" included Rheims
Cathedral and the library at Louvain."' After the war's conclu-
sion, the Treaty of Versailles dealt retroactively with the destruc-
tion, providing only that Germany accept "full responsibility for
causing all the loss and damage which occurred as a result of the
war."" 3  Efforts after the war to deter future wartime pillaging
failed,14 paving the way for the cultural destruction of World
War II.
Rampant pillaging during World War II renewed efforts to
address the problem of wartime looting. Despite some indiscre-
tions on their part, 1 5 the Allies agreed that cultural reparations
were illegal and immoral."6  The German reparations made to
Family honour and rights, the lives of persons, and private
property, as well as religious convictions and practice, must be
respected. Private property cannot be confiscated.
Article 56
The property of municipalities, that of institutions dedicated to
religion, charity and education, the arts and sciences, even when State
property, shall be treated as private property.
All seizure of, destruction or wifu damage done to institutions
of this character, historic monuments, works of art and science, zs
forbidden, and should be made the subject of legal proceedings.
Hague 1907, supra note 15, 1 T.I.A.S. at 651, 653 (emphasis added).
110 Forty-four nations attended the conference which led to this treaty,
including the United States. See 1 MERRYMAN & ELSEN, supra note 105, at 15.
"I See 1 id. at 40.
112 See LEONARD D. DUBOFF, THE DESKBOOK OF ART LAW 136 (Donald
P. Arnavas ed., 1977).
113 Id. (emphasis omitted). Germany was deemed unable to "cover the full
compensation for these losses; restitution, therefore, was limited to compensa-
tion of the civilian population." Id.
114 See Vernon, supra note 101, at 456-57 (discussing such efforts as the
Roerich Pact, the Draft Declaration, and a Draft International Convention for
the Protection of Monuments and Works of Art in Time of War).
11 See supra note 22; NICHOLAS, supra note 18, at 370-405 (discussing in full
the actions of those in favor of cultural restitution).
116 See supra note 22. The United States followed up on such agreements
in 1982 by enacting Public Law 97-155, which authorized the Secretary of the
Army to return to Germany works of art seized by U.S. troops at the end of
World War II. See 1 DUBOFF & CAPLAN, supra note 20, at D-21; see also
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the Allies after the war specifically did not include art treasures,
although some commentators encouraged such an "eye-for-an-eye"
approach. 117  In addition, the destruction of cultural property
constituted a criminal offense at the Nuremberg War Trials."'
The 1907 Hague Convention was, in part, the legal foundation for
these indictments. 9
The Hague Convention of 1954 represented the international
response to the pillaging of World War 11.120 This treaty serves
as the most comprehensive attempt to date to solve the problem
of wartime looting."' Aiming to reestablish the basic principles
prohibiting wartime theft, the convention provided that:
The High Contracting Parties further undertake to
prohibit, prevent, and, if necessary, put a stop to any form
of theft, pillage, or misappropriation of, and any acts of
vandalism directed against, cultural property. They shall
refrain from requisitioning movable cultural property
situated in the territory of another High Contracting
Party. 1
2
The treaty also set forth detailed procedures for the enforcement
of its provisions." Although not specifically retroactive in its
Honan, 3 Are Indicted, supra note 22, at A10 (detailing judicial efforts to resolve
the theft of the Quedlinburg treasures by U.S. soldiers).
117 See 1 MERRYMAN & ELSEN, supra note 105, at 4043 (discussing the
arguments on both sides of this debate).
18 See 1 id. at 20-25.
119 See 1 id. at 21 ("These acts were contrary to international conventions,
particularly Articles 46 to 56 inclusive of the Hague Regulations, 1907, the laws
and customs of war... .") (quoting 1 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS
BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL 55-56 (1948)).
120 See Vernon, supra note 101, at 458 ("The contracting parties to the
Hague 1954 Cultural Property Convention further recognized the damage to
cultural property suffered during World War II .. ").
121 See id. at 459 ("[T]he Hague 1954 Cultural Property Convention is
,sometimes called the "Red Cross" of monuments and museums in time of
war.'").
11 Hague 1954, supra note 15, art. 4, para. 3, 249 U.N.T.S. at 244. While
Germany and the former U.S.S.R. were the initial contracting parties to the
convention, the United States declined to become a party to the treaty. See
DUBOFF, supra note 112, at 181-83.
1 See Hague 1954, supra note 15, arts. 20-28, 249 U.N.T.S. at 256-60.
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approach, the Convention formally incorporates and attaches to
the 1907 and 1899 Hague Conventions. 24
The 1990 and 1992 treaties between Russia and Germany
enforce the basic ideals of the 1954 Hague Convention as
pertaining to the two nations.2' Thus, this line of documents,
dating back over a century, forms a consistent body of law
regarding cultural artifacts in times of war and peace and embodies
one basic sentiment: the preservation of works of art and cultural
heritage despite the conditions of the world surrounding them.
4.2. Dispute over the Law
International law forms the core of Germany's argument for
the return of the trove. 126  Both the initial pillaging by Russia
and its current possession clearly violate the 1907 and 1954 Hague
Conventions and the 1990 and 1992 Russian-German treaties. To
many commentators, Russia's actions also violate the spirit of the
law. 2
Russia, however, asserts that its claim to the trove is legiti-
mate. Seizing upon nuances in the treaties' wording to justify its
actions, the Russian government claims that the treaties only
prohibit illegal looting and that Russia's actions did not fall within
the prohibited conduct.1" Russian officials "contend that
anything transferred to the USSR by order of the Soviet military
command in the Soviet occupied zone ... was removed legally,
since that body was the legally constituted German government
of the time."129 They argue that, since the looting was legal, the
treaties are inapplicable and, therefore, Russia's claim to the art is
completely legitimate."' In addition to the other obstacles
already noted, conflicting definitions of what actions are "illegal"
124 Article 36 of the treaty states that "[i]n the relations between Powers
which are bound by the Conventions of The Hague concerning the Law and
Customs of War on Land (IV) ... and which are Parties to the present
Convention, this last Convention shall be supplementary to the ... Regula-
tions annexed to the aforementioned Convention (IV)." Id. art. 36, para. 1, 249
U.N.T.S. at 264.
a See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text (detailing both treaties).
126 See Statement 1994, supra note 13 (outlining the German legal position).
127 See, e.g., Interview with Constance Lowenthal, supra note 14.
128 See Gambrell, supra note 1, at 90-91.
129 Id.
130 See id.
1997]
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. j Int'l Econ. L.
stand between the two nations.
4.3. Creating a Framework
Much commentary on the Hermitage trove suffers from the
following flaws: (a) the analysis of each perspective in isolation
from the others; (b) the use of a disjointed analytical framework;
(c) the lack of objective standards; and (d) the divisive nature of
the debate. As a result of these defects, the existing analytical
framework has proved ineffective in reaching a fair resolution.
First, commentators have generally viewed each perspective in
isolation from the others. That is, to some commentators the
Hermitage controversy is rooted primarily in politics,131 while
others view it solely as an epilogue to history.1 12 Few commen-
tators note the complexity of the situation, opting instead to
simplify the controversy by examining only one perspective and
arguing for a solution solely within that single level of the
debate.133
The second problem is the disjointed and unintegrated debate
that occurs when commentators actually consider multiple
perspectives. Such commentators generally use each perspective
as a part of an "all-things-considered" analysis.1 4 Commentators
typically use a balancing approach, favoring the Russians on some
perspectives and the Germans on others, ultimately weighing both
and rewarding the party with the biggest analytical bounty.135
Relationships between the perspectives are noted in a cursory
fashion, if at all. As a result, the debate rarely integrates perspec-
tives and fails to appreciate the complexity of the controversy.
The third problem with the present approach derives from
the subjective judgments inherent in balancing different perspec-
tives. This subjectivity allows Russian nationalists to weigh the
131 See Meyer, supra note 5, at A20 ("At bottom, this is a political rather
than a legal dispute.i).
132 See Durden-Smith, supra note 57.
133 See Meyer, supra note 5, at A20; Durden-Smith, supra note 57.
134 Robert Hughes' examination of the Hermitage controversy is an
example of such an "all-things-considered" analysis. See Hughes, supra note 3.
Iughes simply notes each perspective of the controversy without putting them
in a unifying framework. In the process, he minimizes some perspectives,
particularly the legal doctrine involved.
135 See id.
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historical perspective heavily,13' museum curators to look solely
at the cultural perspective, and so on, thereby distorting the actual
value of each perspective according to the commentator's best
interest.137 As a result, commentators diminish some factors 3 '
while amplifying others and, in the end, few objective criteria
exist with which to create a solution.
The balancing approach also has a divisive effect on the
communities involved in the debate.139 If the current analysis
ultimately leads to a solution, it is likely that some communities
will feel shortchanged and dissatisfied with the solution. Further-
more, it encourages political confrontation rather than construc-
tive cooperation between the involved parties. An example of this
occurred during the Elgin Marbles debate, when the Greek
government, armed primarily with nationalistic arguments,
lobbied extensively to secure the return of the treasures from
Great Britain. 14° This propelled the controversy to a purely
political level, resulting in a diplomatic rift between Greece and
Great Britain. Instead of concerned parties working together to
find a proper solution, the "all-things-considered" framework
divides and isolates the parties. In the end, this approach only
harms the chances of uniting the art community.
These problems indicate the need for another method to
resolve the controversy. An objective framework carefully
considering each perspective must be used to fashion a solution
that satisfies all parties and perspectives. 14' A proper analytical
136 See supra notes 4849 and accompanying text (discussing the primarily
historical perspective of Pushkin director Irina Antonova).
137 See BATOR, supra note 93, at 18 (discussing this tendency towards "over-
simplified debates" surrounding the international trade in art .
13 See, e.g., Hughes, supra note 3 (analyzing the controversy using a
balancing approach and minimizing the legal perspective).
139 An obvious example is the tension between Russian and German
officials. Russian officials focus on the historical perspective, see supra notes 65-
66 and accompanying text, and their German counterparts continually cite legal
arguments. See supra notes 126-27 and accompanying text. As a result, there
has been little agreement and much tension between the two groups.
140 See Merryman, supra note 4, at 1911-16 (discussing the Greek nationalis-
tic arguments for the return of the Elgin Marbles); see also JEANETTE
GREENFIELD, THE RETURN OF CuLTURAL TREASURES 47 (1989) (noting the
Greek position that the Elgin Marbles "are an integral part of the Acropolis,
which symbolizes Greece itself").
141 See John Henry Merryman, The Public Interest in Cultural Property, 77
CAL. L. REv. 339, 341 (1989) (discussing the need for a proper "framework for
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framework must integrate each perspective, balance the impor-
tance of each properly, and, most importantly, acknowledge and
account for each perspective, thereby diminishing the potential for
antagonism between parties. The use of the legal doctrine as the
linchpin, weaving all perspectives together, provides such a
framework.
Most commentators err in treating the legal issues as simply
another perspective, isolated from the others.142 Instead, what
is required is a framework that uses the legal perspective as an
umbrella, covering and including each of the other perspec-
tives.143 Legal doctrine is unique in that it does not spring from
a vacuum, but rather is created with and from other perspectives.
Thus, a law does not merely define a legal perspective, but rather
articulates the integration of other societal values that were
considered by the framers of the given statute and those who later
interpret such statutes. For instance, the framers of the Hague
Conventions accounted for many of the considerations now being
debated in the Hermitage controversy. In light of this, it is
myopic to look at the legal perspective as isolated from the rest.
Instead, commentators must recognize that the legal perspective
encompasses and integrates other interests.
This Comment proposes a framework based upon this
understanding of law as a tool for integration. The first step in
this framework is simply to determine the legal solution to this
controversy. The second step details the other perspectives,
showing how the legal solution accounts for each relevant
factor."M The legal doctrine emerged from consideration of
thinking about cultural property").
142 See Yardley Rosemar, Who Owns the Art Loot?, GREENSBORO (N.C.)
NEWS & REC., Mar. 31, 1995, at All (treating the legal perspective as wholly
independent from the debate).
" See BATOR, supra note 93, at 18-34 (using a variety of "relevant values
of interests" to assess and propose legal systems for regulating the international
trade in art).
144 This strategy envisions the Hague Conventions as essentially creating
strict liability for-looting. See WILIAM L. PROSSER, ET AL., CASES AND
MATERIALS ON TORTS 669-95 (8th ed. 1988) (discussing strict liability, under
which the tortfeasor is held liable for her actions regardless of intent and
reasonable precautions). With strict liability statutes, the balancing of
arguments primarily occurs during the statute's framing. The framework
created by this Comment likewise presumes that the balancing of most factors
occurred during the framing, thus imposing strict liability regardless of such
factors during the later judgment of a specific instance of pillaging.
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these specific arguments and thus further discussion of them is
simply redundant. The purpose, therefore, is not to explore such
arguments on their merits; instead, the goal is to determine
whether these arguments should be discarded in the face of
international law's explicit rebuttal of the significance of such
arguments.
The final step looks at perspectives either specific to the given
situation or, as determined by the second step, outside of the
framers' consideration. Such perspectives are evaluated in light of
the legal viewpoint to determine whether the strength of such
considerations outweigh the legal solution. A strong presumption,
however, exists in favor of the party with legal authority'45
This framework provides several advantages. First, it is based
primarily on the objective criteria of the law. 4' Second, it
integrates all the perspectives into a common framework, taking
each into account while avoiding the problem of subjectively
weighing them independently. Third, it avoids dwelling on
arguments already considered and disposed of. Finally, it achieves
a legitimacy that other approaches lack. This legitimacy stems
from two sources: the fact that this solution is based on treaties
signed by all concerned parties147 and the fair consideration this
framework accords to each perspective.
The remainder of this Comment analyzes the Hermitage
controversy using this framework. Ultimately, this analysis will
yield a solution based on fairness, objectivity, and inclusiveness
instead of subjectivity and divisiveness.
5. APPLYING THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK
5.1. Legality of Russia's Possession
Despite Russia's arguments to the contrary, international law
dictates that the trove be returned to Germany.14 ' The 1907
145 See Merryman, supra note 4, at 1899 (conducting an analysis of the Elgin
Marbles controversy, focusing on the legal and moral implications, and noting
the presumption in favor of the legally entitled party).
146 See id. at 1894 (indicating the need for reasoned standards in discussing
cultural heritage issues).
147 See Thomas M. Franck, Legitimacy in the International System, 82 AM.
J. INT'L L. 705, 707 (1988) (discussing the legitimacy of international law).
14 For a far more comprehensive analysis of both parties' legal arguments,
see S. Shawn Stephens, The Hermitage and Pushkin Exhibits: An Analysis of the
1997]
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L.
Hague Convention was the governing treaty during the time of
the plunder, World War I. The plain language of the 1907 treaty
prohibits wartime looting, stating that all "seizure of... works
of art and science is forbidden.""' The treaty was used to
prosecute pillaging Nazis at the Nuremberg Trials,'-' and the
Allies reaffirmed the spirit of the treaty through post-war action
ensuring the return of looted art. I  The 1954 treaty, to which
Russia was a party,5 2 repeated the 1907 treaty's opposition to
wartime looting. Thus, by the plain language of the treaty
enforced at the time of the pillage, Russia's actions were ille-
gal. 
153
Differences between German and Russian looting during
World War II did exist, but none of these distinctions change the
sheer illegality of Russia's acts. First, it can be argued that
Russia's status as a wartime victim changes the legal situation.
Anti-pillaging treaties are typically applied to aggressor nations,
such as Nazi Germany. 54 According to proponents of this
argument, since Russia was the victim and not the aggressor in
World War II, it is entitled to some restitution. Since the treaties
are only intended to outlaw pillaging by the conqueror, it can be
argued that they do not apply to Russia's actions, which simply
provided restitution to the attacked nation."55
This argument fails, however, as the treaties condemn all
pillaging, regardless of circumstances. 156  The 1907 treaty is
broad in both words and spirit, using such general language as "all
seizure.""5 Furthermore, the Allies addressed the cultural
restitution issue during and after the war, concluding that seizure
Ownership Rights to Cultural Properties Removed from Occupied Germany, 18
HoUs. J. INT'L L. 59 (1995).
9 Hague 1907, supra note 15, art. 56, 1 T.I.A.S. at 653.
150 See supra notes 118-19 and accompanying text.
151 See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
152 See supra note 122.
153 See Stephens, supra note 148, at 73-75.
'5 See supra note 118 (discussing the application of the 1907 treaty to the
Nazis during the Nuremberg trials).
151 See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
156 See Hague 1907, supra note 15, art. 56, 1 T.I.A.S. at 653 ("All seizure of
... works of art and science, is forbidden .... ."); Hague 1954, supra note 15,
art. 4, para. 3, 249 U.N.T.S. at 244 ("The High Contracting Parties further
undertake to prohibit ... any form of theft [or] pillage ....
157 Hague 1907, supra note 15, art. 56, 1 T.I.A.S. at 653.
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of art as reparations was inappropriate1 5 8 and against internation-
al law. 159 While tragic, Russia's situation is irrelevant to the
determination of legality.
The second basis for Russia's denial of the legal claim concerns
the supposed legality of their actions." Russian officials claim
that because they were the sovereign power over parts of
Germany at the time of the pillaging, their actions were fully
legal.1 61 These officials contend that, since the 1907 and other
treaties pertain only to illegal actions, they are inapplicable to
Russia's plunder.16 This argument, however, fails for several
reasons.
First, this argument is counterintuitive. Russia shared the
same position as other victorious countries that have claimed legal
power over a conquered nation. 63 It is recognized that "bellig-
erent wartime occupations do not affect the sovereignty of an
occupied state."1" The treaties were created in the wake of
151 See supra note 22 and accompanying text. This was despite the fact that
the other Allies were, like Russia, also victims of Nazi aggression.
19 Much of the opposition to cultural reparations after World War II
concerned the unimportance of this distinction between the Allies and the
Nazis. In the Weisbaden document, the Monuments, Fine Arts, and Archives
(MFAA") officers noted the inherent hypocrisy of making such a distinction,
stating that:
The Allied Nations are at present preparing to prosecute individuals
for the crime of sequestering, under pretext of "protective custody,.
the cultural treasures of German-occupied countries. A major part of
the indictment follows upon the reasoning that, even though these
individuals were acting under military orders, the dictates of a higher
ethical law made it incumbent upon them to refuse to take part in, or
countenance, the fulfillment of tese orders. We, the undersigned, feel
it is our duty to point out that, though as members of the Armed
Forces we will carry out the orders we receive, we are thus put before
any candid eyes as no less culpable than those whose prosecution we affect
to sanction.
Weisbaden Manifesto, supra note 22, at 1 (emphasis added). See also NICHOLAS,
supra note 18, at 394-96 (discussing the VIFAA document).
160 See supra notes 128-30 and accompanying text.
161 See Stephens, supra note 148, at 93-96.
162 See id
163 For example, Nazi Germany claimed sovereignty over France and other
conquered countries during World War I. See NICHOLAS, supra note 18, at 86-
97 (discussing the Nazi invasion of France).
'6 Stephens, supra note 148, at 71.
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various instances of plunder by the conquering nation 6 ' with
newfound, but limited, legal authority over the conquered
nation. 166 Likewise, officials at Nuremberg found Nazi plunder-
ing, even in countries where they had legal authority, inconsistent
with the 1907 treaty.167  In terms of legal authority, Russia's
position was analogous to that of both Napoleonic France and
Nazi Germany, and thus their pillaging was precisely what the
1907 treaty intended to counter. 168 To hold otherwise would
severely diminish the treaty's power and allow any country to
pillage the art of another nation over which it exercises temporary
control, thus justifying the actions of Hitler's Germany,
Napoleon's France, and even Saddam Hussein's Iraq.
Furthermore, the 1990 and 1992 treaties between Russia and
Germany render Russia's argument moot. These treaties provide
for the return of both "missing" and "unlawfully" removed
cultural property.169 Even if the applicability of the 1907 treaty
were in question, these later treaties are unambiguous in their
wording. 70  Regardless of the legality of Russia's actions, the
artwork falls within the treaties' definition of "missing," thereby
making the treaties fully applicable. 17' Therefore, Russia's
linguistic distinction is irrelevant under the terms of these treaties.
In sum, both the plain wording and spirit of the 1907, 1990,
and 1992 treaties clearly prohibit Russia's initial looting and
165 See, e.., 1 DUBOFF & CAPLAN, supra note 20, at D-5 to D-7 (discussing
the pillage ofthe Americas by France and Spain during the exploration era).
166 See Stephens, supra note 148, at 71-72 (noting that the rights exercised
by an occupying power "are not co-extensive with those of sovereignty" and
"are due to the military exigencies created by the invader, and, consequently,
are only provisional").
16 See supra note 118.
168 The Allies' actions further reinforce the applicability of the 1907 treaty.
See supra note 116 and accompanying text. Given that they too were
technically the legal authorities over parts of Germany, their plundering would
have had the same legal value as that of Russia. Their recognition of the
illegality of such actions, identical to Russia's activities, thus reinforces the
notion that Russia's acts were illegal.
169 See supra notes 28-29.
170 See Statement 1994, supra note 13, at 5 ("By choosing to write 'missing
or unlawfully cultural property' the contracting parties obviously wanted to
show that two different categories of cultural property are meant... and that
for each of these categories viewed separately there exists an obligation to
return the property.").
171 See id.
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subsequent possession of the trove. Therefore, Russia is legally
obligated to return the art to Germany. The following sections
examine the other perspectives, explaining how they are incorpo-
rated under this legal doctrine and thus reinforce the legitimacy
of this conclusion.
5.2. Historical Justifications
Russians claim the tide of history is on their side, asserting
that the Nazi ravages of World War II require their continued
possession of the Hermitage trove."' Such historical justifica-
tions, however, are not new arguments; instead, sovereign nations
have already discussed and dismissed historical reparation
considerations in the framing and application of previous treaties.
The 1907 treaty implicitly presumed that all seizures of art are
forbidden, including those taken for the purpose of restitution.
The purpose of this legal doctrine was to render such historical
arguments moot, so that they could not serve as an independent
basis for possession."3
First, the broad wording of the 1907 treaty indicates that such
historical arguments are immaterial. The convention does not
differentiate between types of pillaging; it simply bans all taking
of art.'74 The unambiguous wording of the treaty indicates the
strength of the framers' convictions that no cultural looting is
appropriate, regardless of circumstance, and thereby rejects an
"eye-for-an-eye" argument.
Second, interpretation of the 1907 treaty has repeatedly yielded
the proposition that the treaty rejects the "restitution" argument.
For instance, the question of the legality of restitution was
discussed after World War 1I.17s The extent of the harm inflict-
ed by the Nazis was fully known after the end of the war, and
any historical arguments now cited by Russia were passionately
in See supra section 3.1.
"' Returning to the strict liability analogy, one is liable for damage by
abnormally dangerous materials. See PROSSER, supra note 144, at 673-88. Thus,
in a specific case, the perception of the dangerous nature of a presumptively
dangerous material is irrelevant, as the debate about the dangerous nature
already occurred during the framing of the statute. Similarly, within this
Comment's analysis, an argument already considered and dismissed during the
framing of these treaties is also treated as irrelevant.
"7' See supra note 156.
s See supra note 22.
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debated at that time. 176 Despite the extent of this harm, postwar
debate concluded that the 1907 treaty, among other sources,l1
7
7
rendered cultural reparations inappropriate and illegal.
17 8
Finally, the nearly identical wording of the 1954 Hague
Convention17 9 further reinforces this point. By choosing not to
change the wording of the 1954 treaty to reflect disapproval with
the post-World War II interpretation of the 1907 treaty, the
framers of the 1954 treaty essentially approved such an anti-
reparations interpretation.
These arguments demonstrate that the use of broad language
by the framers of the 1907 treaty sought to directly counter such
historical reparations arguments, and have been consistently
interpreted as such. Thus, instead of existing as a legitimate and
independent basis for possession, historical arguments are precisely
the type that the 1907 treaty aimed to counter and are inherently
incorporated into the legal perspective.
5.3. Political Motivations
Political arguments likewise fail to overcome legal doctrine.
First, the very nature of international law silences political
arguments. International agreements demand that all participating
nations act to achieve a higher goal, relinquishing their political
motivations even "in a situation where the rule conflicts with
perceived self-interest."180  Thus, the 1907 and subsequent
treaties, as with most international conventions, render political
interests obsolete.
In this specific case, the Hague Conventions were framed with
the express motivation of preserving cultural heritage despite
political circumstances.181 Early treaties, including the 1907
176 See id.
177 See DUBOFF, supra note 112, at 160 (discussing other legal support for
the post-World War II consensus).
178 See supra note 156; NICHOLAS, supra note 18, at 402 (noting that U.S.
officials cited to the 1907 Convention in support of the return of art to
Germany after World War I).
179 Compare Hague 1907, supra note 15, art. 56, 1 T.I.A.S. at 653 with
Hague 1954, supra note 15, art. 4, 249 U.N.T.S. at 244.
18' Franck, supra note 147, at 707.
... The 1954 Hague Convention is generally thought to endorse the
concept of "cultural internationalism," by which art is seen as the property of
the world rather than of one political entity. See Vernon, supra note 101, at
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Convention, responded to pillage arising from political disputes,
such as the plundering by Napoleon's armies.182 Similarly, the
1954 convention represented the international response to
Germany's political actions." 3 The applicable treaties, therefore,
render the political interests of both Russia and Germany
irrelevant. To argue otherwise is to deny the legitimacy of
international treaties and their inherent power to override political
considerations.1 14 Additionally, the use of political justifications
ignores the circumstances that gave rise to these treaties. Thus, as
with the historical perspective, political arguments offer no
independent basis for possession.
5.4. Economic Boon
The economic perspective is not as obviously incorporated
into the legal doctrine. Nonetheless, economic arguments exert
little influence in this framework. First, the Hague Conventions
most likely render economic motivations irrelevant, for many of
the same reasons that negate political arguments."8 ' Thus, the
1907 treaty inherently forbids all seizures regardless of economic
arguments.
Even if the economic perspective is not directly incorporated
under the legal doctrine, it may be considered part of the political
perspective. Economic and political interests are often peculiarly
intertwined; economic stakes often influence political actions and
obliterate any divisions between the two motivations. 86 In this
case, the economic perspective is simply a subset of the political
interests of the countries, and no independent explanation for the
treaties' incorporation of these interests is necessary.
Furthermore, other factors render economic arguments moot
459. Thus, the specific interests of nations are irrelevant when determining the
proper home for cultural heritage. See id.
182 See 1 MERRYMAN & ELSEN, supra note 105, at 14-19 (discussing
Napoleon's plundering).
183 See Vernon, supra note 101, at 458 ("The contracting parties to the
Hague 1954 Cultural Property Convention further recognized tihe damage to
cultural property suffered during World War H ... .
184 See Franck, supra note 147, at 707.
185 See supra section 5.3 (discussing the legal doctrine's incorporation of the
political perspective).
186 See BATOR, supra note 93, at 27-28 (discussing the influence of economic
issues in political disputes such as the Elgin Marbles controversy).
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regardless of the incorporation status of this perspective. The
development of art as big business is a relatively recent phenome-
non." It is reasonable to assume that the framers of these
treaties did not contemplate any economic motivation in disputes
over cultural heritage and that the economic perspective is not
incorporated under the applicable law. Even if this is true,
however, economic arguments are neutral and thus favor neither
nation. Potential economic benefits are similar for the art
institutions of both Russia and Germany, and given international
law's inherent neutrality,18 neither side enjoys most-favored
status. Thus, regardless of if and how economic concerns are
incorporated under the legal framework, this line of argument has
no independent value as a determinant of possessory rights.
5.5. The Artwork's Best Interest
The final, and most unique, perspective is the interests of the
artwork itself. 89 This argument differs significantly from the
other perspectives, as it involves the very foundation of the
applicable law-preservation of cultural heritage. The primary
purpose of the 1907 Hague Convention and its successors is to
protect artwork and other cultural treasures.?' Therefore, if the
framers of these treaties took such interests into account,' 9' the
117 See Merryman, supra note 141, at 355 n.70 (discussing the growth of the
art market); see also Lisa J. Borodkin, Note, The Economics of Antiquities
Looting and a Proposed Legal Alternative, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 377, 378(1995)
(discussing the "tremendous economic incentives for dealing in stolen artifacts");
Robert Lacey, A Grand Old Rivalry, VANITY FAIR, Jan. 1996, at 104, 114
(discussing the growth of the "notion of art as an investment").
188 See Franck, supra note 147, at 708 (discussing the "international rules of
neutrality").
189 See Merryman, supra note 141 (discussing the importance of cultural
property in society). Many commentators, including Johi Merryman, believe
that the interest of the pieces of cultural heritage themselves is the most
important factor in such cases, transcending political and legal boundaries. See
Merryman, supra note 4, at 1916-21.
190 See Cathryn A. Berryman, Toward More Universal Protection of
Intangible Cultural Property, 1 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 293, 330 (1994)
("[P]reservation of physical works is the obvious objective [of international art
conventions]."); see also Teresa McGuire, International Dimensions, 11
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 59, 59 (1992) (referring to the importance of
"protecting and sharing cultural property").
191 This is entirely possible. After World War II, some Allied policymakers
favored U.S. possession of German art in order to properly preserve it. See
NICHOLAS, supra note 18, at 390 (quoting a U.S. general speaking of the need
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treaties fail to achieve and, in fact, work against their objective if
they do not actually preserve artwork. If the treaties impair the
condition and accessibility of the art, legal authority becomes
irrelevant and the art should be kept in Russia.192 Thus, this is
the one perspective that requires analysis independent from the
legal perspective and necessitates an independent exploration of
cultural heritage arguments.
This preservation of cultural heritage viewpoint consists of
three separate claims. First, the world community should credit
Russia for preserving the artwork for a half-century.193 Second,
the art is, and will continue to be, safer and better-maintained in
Russian institutions than in their German counterparts.
1 9 4
Finally, the trove is more accessible to the international communi-
ty in Russia than in Germany.19' None of these arguments,
however, stands on sufficient footing to override international
law.
The first prong of this perspective focuses on the "rescue
argument,"196 under which the looting country receives the art
because it kept the art in better condition than if the art had been
maintained by the country of origin.1 97 In the case of the
to "preserve [the art] for the German people"). Conversely, one argument
often used to prevent U.S. possession was the potential for damage of art while
in transit across the Atlantic Ocean. See id. at 389-90. The 1954 Hague
Convention was framed in the wake of this debate, and such arguments
presumably were in the minds of the framers. Despite such interests, the actual
treaty lacks an "in the best interest of the art" clause. This omission indicates
the categorical rejection of such interests.
192 Some commentators, however, have criticized this approach as mere
subjective paternalism. See Interview with Constance Lowenthl, supra note 14.
But see Borodkin, supra note 187, at 379 n.13 (noting the opinion that the best
interest of the art must take priority over legality issues).
193 See supra note 96 and accompanying text (discussing the condition of the
trove).
194 See Merryman, supra note 141, at 355-56 (discussing the preservation
argument).
195 See infra notes 204-06 and accompanying text.
196 See Karen J. Warren, A Philosophical Perspective on the Ethics and
Resolution of Cultural Property Issues, in THE ETHICS OF COLLECTING
CULTURAL PROPERTY: WHOSE CULTURE? WHOSE PROPERTY? 1, 3-4 (Phyllis
M. Messenger ed., 1989) (discussing the rescue argument).
.97 This argument was frequently cited by supporters of the British
Museum's continued possession of the Elgin Marbles. See John Moustakas,
Note, Group Rights in Cultural Property: Justifving Strict Inalienability, 74
CORNELL L. REV. 1179, 1179 n.2 (1989) ("Those in whose best interests it has
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Hermitage trove, however, there are two flaws with this argu-
ment. First, there is dispute as to how much credit Russia should
receive for preserving the art. Commentators note that Russia's
actions are more akin to "benign neglect" than affirmative
effort. 98 The artwork was properly preserved primarily because
it was stored in a secure underground climate, without exposure
to either the elements or humanity, for fifty years.'" Further-
more, there is little reason to believe that the art would have been
damaged had it been left in occupied postwar Germany.' The
rescue argument, with dubious value, therefore fails.
The second prong of this argument, the future preservation of
the art, likewise fails. Russian museums are primitive in some
respects and in desperate need of renovations and modern
preservation facilities."0 German museums, in comparison, are
equally, if not better, equipped to preserve the trove.202 The
stronger economic position of German art institutions also
indicates that the art may be safer in German hands. Russian
institutions therefore do not seem better prepared to protect the
art than German museums and collections.
Finally, there exists a viable argument regarding accessibil-
ity.' On the one hand, the Hermitage exhibition was a text-
book example of a gala international art event, well-publicized and
been to suggest that the Greeks are, or at least were, incompetent to care for
their artistic treasures have argued that retention of plundered art is justified
because such art belongs to the 'common heritage of-mankind.").
198 See Interview with Constance Lowenthal, supra note 14.
199 See id.
200 Art in other parts of Germany generally stood undamaged duringthe
postwar period, and the Allies protected art throughout Germany without
iltimately seizing the works. See NICHOLAS, supra note 18, at 369-405 (noting
that despite much debate, most art was kept in, or immediately returned to,
occupied Germany after World War ag). Pill ing, therefore, was unnecessary
to preserve the art.
201 See supra note 85 and accompanying text (discussing the condition of
Russian museums).
202 See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
203 This is similar to the argument labeled by some as the "scholarly access"
argument, although that argument is limited primarily to scholars and members
of the art community. See Warren, supra note 196, at 7 ("In order to preserve
cultural properties, those whose primary responsibility or role is to promote
and transmit cultural information and knoicledge ... must have scholarly
access to cultural properties."); Merryman, supra note 141, at 360-61 (discussing
the access argument. This Comment's version of this argument simply
broadens this definition to the public and other concerned parties.
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well-coordinated, 2°4 and, despite the debate over the legality of
Russia's actions, few argue that the exhibit did not do the art
justice.205 The success of "Hidden Treasures Revealed" demon-
strates that the Hermitage is more than capable of appropriately
showcasing the trove. In addition, the Hermitage is one of the
world's preeminent museums,2 6 a fact that lends further support
to Russia's position-much as an exhibit in the Metropolitan
Museum of Art is more accessible to the public than a private
collector's living room, it seems fitting that important art like that
which makes up the trove have an appropriately significant home
like the Hermitage.
Germany, however, can also claim its share of prominent
museums similarly well-suited for showcasing the trove. 7 Art
that is returned to private collections can also be exhibited by
means of a remote tour similar to the Barnes Foundation
exhibition.208 Additionally, Russia is not an inviting location
for visitors, with its troubled economic and political situations and
other barriers of entry.' The accessibility argument favors
Germany as much as it does Russia, and therefore fails to justify
Russian possession.
In sum, Germany is as worthy a home for the trove as Russia.
Any potential strength of the rescue, preservation, and accessibili-
ty arguments in Russia's favor are debatable and do not override
the legal presumption in Germany's favor. The emotional
arguments for Russia's continued possession may be strong;
however, Russia must find other ways of healing the wounds of
the past, as Germany is the rightful holder of the Hermitage
trove.
6. CONCLUSION
By using legal treaties as its touchstone and giving fair
consideration to non-legal perspectives, the analytic framework
used above is fair and objective in its determination that Germany
is entitled to the return of the Hermitage trove. The same values
2"4 See supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text.
205 See id.
201 See supra note 83.
"o See supra note 99.
211 See supra note 90.
209 See supra note 97.
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that guided this analysis, fairness and inclusiveness, should
similarly guide the process of returning the trove. That Germany
is ultimately entitled to the trove, however, does not dictate that
the Russian government must immediately return the art. Instead,
alternative solutions exist that can provide Germany with eventual
possession of the art while simultaneously calming political
passions.
Some commentators have proposed that "the Germans aid
Russia and the other former Soviet republics with restoration
projects, museum renovation, library acquisitions and the like. In
return, most of the art would be restored to its former owners,
and some would be donated or loaned to former Soviet muse-
ums."210 Such creative solutions ultimately enable all parties to
benefit from this controversy, and, more importantly, to build
bridges within the international art community.
Indeed, there is hope for such a solution. In 1995, Jorn
Merkert, Director of the Berlinsche Galerie in Berlin, and Irina
Antonova, the aforementioned Director of the Pushkin Museum,
attempted to bridge the gap between Russia and Germany through
an exhibition entitled "Berlin-Moscow/Moscow-Berlin 1900-
1950." "2 The exhibition consisted of approximately 2500
paintings, sculptures, models, and other pieces of cultural heritage
detailing the relations between the two cities."' Such an exhibit
illustrates the potential for cooperation between the art communi-
ties of both nations, even when dealing with controversial
subjects, to present art in a fashion that transcends political
differences. In a similar fashion, the Hermitage controversy,
while rooted in deep divisions between nations, can ultimately
serve to heal, rather than reopen, the wounds of World War II.
210 Gambrell, supra note 1, at 120 (noting the opinions of such art experts
as Wolfgang Eichwede of Bremen's East European Research Institute and
Ekaterina Geneiva, director of Russia's Foreign Literature Library). See also
Stephens, supra note 148, at 110 (noting that "this dispute initially appears to
offer a perfect scenario for a Solomonic 'split the baby' resolution"); Who Owns
This Art?, supra note 76, at 12A (proposing alternative solutions to this
controversy).
211 See Jamey Gambrell & Christopher Phillips, Red Wedge, Black Wedge:
Relationship Between Russian and German Art, Martin Gropius Bau, Berlin,
Germany, ART IN AM., Dec. 1995, at 72.
212 See id.
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